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1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the Appellate Body (AB) report on European
Community  Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe
Fittings from Brazil.1 The underlying Panel determination was appealed
by the complainant Brazil only. Following the approach it took before
the Panel, Brazil raised a number of issues concerning the antidumping
investigation by the European Community (EC). The five substantive
issues were:
1. Whether the Panel correctly found that the EC acted consistently
with its obligations under the Antidumping (AD) Agreement when
not accounting for the devaluation of the Brazilian currency
(see Section 2 of this chapter);
2. whether the Panel correctly found that the EC treated ‘‘low-volume’’
imports consistently with its international obligations (Section 3);
1 WTO Doc. WT/DS219/AB/R, 22 July, 2003.
* We are grateful to David Palmeter, and especially to Jasper-Martijn Wauters,
for numerous discussions on the issues addressed in this chapter.
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3. whether the Panel correctly found that the absence of separate
findings of ‘‘growth’’ factors in the EC final determination is con-
sistent with the EC’s WTO obligations (Section 4);
4. whether the Panel correctly found that there is no need to examine
individually the impact of factors for which the cumulative impact
has been assessed (Section 5); and
5. whether the Panel correctly found that the EC fully respected its
obligations in its treatment of the causality element (Section 6).
The main procedural issues raised concerned the Panel’s finding that
a certain document was properly before the EC investigating authority
and also its finding concerning the EC’s disclosure obligations with
respect to this document (Section 7).
Before commencing our discussion of the AB determinations, let us
emphasize that, when addressing the normative issue of what the AB in
our view should have decided on the issues appealed, we will not put
into question the purpose of the AD instrument, which we interpret to
be to insulate an importing country from the effect of international price
discrimination. As is often pointed out, it is not easy to reconcile this
purpose with economic theory, and there is a significant empirical body
of literature demonstrating various (from an economicefficiency point
of view, often adverse) ‘‘side effects’’ from, e.g. antidumping investiga-
tions. It is therefore not an easy task to determine economically desirable
interpretations of provisions of such an agreement. Consequently,
we simply take the desirability of counteracting international price
discrimination for granted.
2 How should have devaluations been treated during the
period of investigation (POI)?
The contested antidumping investigation lasted for a year and led to
the establishment of a dumping margin of 34.8%.2 Approximately
three months before the investigation’s conclusion, the Brazilian
Real was devalued by 42%. The first substantive issue discussed in the
dispute was how this devaluation should have been taken into account
by the EC.
2 For a more comprehensive account of the facts, see xx 66ff of the AB report.
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2.1 The Panel’s findings
Brazil argued before the Panel that the EC violated its obligations under
the AD Agreement (Art. 2.4.2 AD) by not sufficiently accounting for the
Real’s devaluation. The Panel rejected this argument, holding that
the EC had to choose one of the two methods for price comparison
included in Art. 2.4.2 AD. In x 7.106 of its report, the Panel dismissed
the Brazilian argument in the following terms:3
[W]e see no foundation in the text of the Agreement . . . for a requirement
that an investigating authority re-assess its own determination made
on the basis of an examination of data pertaining to the [POI] prior to
the imposition of an anti-dumping measure in the light of an event
which occurred during the [POI]. We decline to read such a provision
into the text.4
2.2 The issues before the AB
Brazil presented a somewhat different argument before the AB, empha-
sizing the wording of Art. VI.2 GATT, which states that the purpose of
AD duties is to offset dumping. In Brazil’s view, this wording makes
it plain that what is being addressed through AD duties is current rather
than past behavior, and that therefore the whole investigation process
should be geared towards this end.
Brazil also argued that it did not have to establish the legal relevance
of the GATT to the AD Agreement, since numerous panel and AB
reports before had made it clear that AD duties must be imposed
in accordance with both Art. VI.2 GATT, as well as various provisions of
the AD Agreement. More specifically, Brazil claimed that, in order
to fulfill the purpose of AD duties (to offset dumping), Art. VI.2
GATT should serve as a guide to select among the methodologies for
price comparisons laid down in Art. 2.4.2 AD. In other words,
investigating authorities are not always free to choose the methodology
for price comparison. There could be cases where their discretion is
prejudged. One such case is when devaluation has occurred in the
3 The Panel report is reflected in WTO Doc. WT/DS218/R of 7 March 2003 (hereinafter
the Panel report).
4 POI stands for period of investigation (in this instance, the antidumping investigation).
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country of the exporter. In the instant case, Brazil maintained that
the EC should have:
(i) used only post-devaluation data, since pre-devaluation data are
irrelevant; and
(ii) compared the weighted average normal value, pre-devaluation,
to specific export transactions, post-devaluation.
Brazil found support for its claim in the second sentence of
Art. 2.4.2 AD, which reads:
Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4,
the existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase
shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison of
a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of prices of
all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal value
and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal value
established on a weighted average basis may be compared to prices of
individual export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export
prices which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions
or time periods, and if an explanation is provided as to why such
differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use of
a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction
comparison.
In Brazil’s view, in a devaluation scenario, an antidumping authority
should only compare a weighted average to prices of individual
transactions. Hence, in such cases, investigating authorities do not
have the luxury to choose between the two methodologies embedded
in the first sentence of Art. 2.4.2 AD; they must always opt for the
methodology reflected in its second sentence.
In the AB’s view, the argument by Brazil raises two issues (x 74 of the
AB report):
First, we must determine whether Article VI.2 of the GATT 1994 imposes
an obligation on an investigating authority to select a particular
comparison methodology under Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Second, if we find such an obligation to exist in
Article VI.2, we must determine whether the facts of this case required
the European Commission, pursuant to Article 2.4.2, to compare
weighted average normal value for the entire POI with prices of
individual export transactions from the post-devaluation period of the
POI. (emphasis in the original)
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Hence, the AB would examine whether the EC violated its obligations in
this specific instance, only if it first found that as a matter of principle
Art. VI.2 GATT imposes an obligation on WTO Members to select
a particular methodology among those provided for in the first sentence
of Art. 2.4.2 AD.
2.3 The AB’s response
The AB upheld the Panel’s findings in this respect for the following
reasons (x 84):
First, Art. VI.2 GATT does not, in the AB’s view, lend support
to the Brazilian argument. Art. VI.2 GATT, the AB notes, reads:
In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on
any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than
the margin of dumping in respect of such product.
In the AB’s view, this provision aims to ensure that the dumping margin
will never be exceeded (x 75). In fact, specific provisions of the AD
Agreement are more explicit and underscore the effet utile of Art. VI.2
GATT: for example, Art. 9.3 AD makes it clear that if the duties imposed
exceed the dumping margin, there is an obligation to refund, and duties
cannot, according to Art. 11 AD, remain in place longer than necessary
to counteract dumping (x 81). In short, Art. VI.2 GATT aims to ensure
that the dumping margin will constitute the ceiling of duties imposed
and does not prejudge the methodology used to determine the dumping
margin.
Second, as a matter of legislative technique, the AB noticed the level
of detail in other provisions figuring in the AD Agreement. In the AB’s
view, had the founding fathers wanted to impose one methodology
over another, be it only in specific cases, they would have done so in
an explicit manner (x 77).
Third, the AB played with a couple of counterfactuals. In one scenario,
devaluation occurs on the last day of the POI. In the AB’s view, in
such a case, the argument put forward by Brazil would oblige the
investigating authority to discard the vast majority of transactions and
perhaps focus on only one in order to establish the dumping margin,
an outcome the AB finds undesirable, since it would go against the
obligation to employ representative data (x 78). By the same token,
if at the end of the POI there is re-evaluation of the currency of the
exporter, one would end up with a different, paradoxical outcome (x 79).
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2.4 Discussion
We disagree with the AB’s determination, and instead believe that
a major structural change in the conditions under which pricing
decisions are made should be taken into account by the investigating
authority, as explained below.
2.4.1 How does the exchange rate affect the calculated
dumping margin?
Let us start by briefly examining whether a (significant) devaluation
is likely to affect calculated dumping margins. To this end, we will use
a highly stylized example in which a Brazilian firm sells its product at
home and in the EC market. The price in the home market is 5 Reais,
while the price in the EC market is 3 Euros. The exchange rate is 1 Real/
Euro. The firm is thus dumping (5 Reais charged in the home market
compared to 3 in the EC, or 5 Euros compared to 3).
The Real is now devalued, the new rate becoming 2 Reais/Euro.
Suppose first that the firm retains prices constant in Reais. The price
in Euros would then fall in direct proportion to the deterioration of
the value of the Real, that is, from 3 to 1.50. In this case there would
be no change in the dumping margin, since the price in Reais would
remain the same as before.
In an alternative scenario, the Brazilian firm instead maintains
its local price in the EC constant, that is, the Euro-denominated price.
The price in the EC market, expressed in Reais, will then increase
in direct proportion to the devaluation, from 3 to 6 Reais. Since this will
exceed the price charged in the Brazilian market, dumping will have
ceased to exist.
As can be seen from these two examples, the reaction of the Brazilian
firm to devaluation matters crucially for the calculation of dumping
margins. The two scenarios can be seen as polar cases. One should
normally expect something in between to occur, that is, that the price
in the EC market falls, but by less than the full amount of the devalu-
ation  that there is less than full exchange rate ‘‘pass-through.’’5 The
price in the EC market, expressed in Reais, will then increase, thus partly
reducing the dumping margin, as long as the local Brazilian price
remains constant. More generally, the optimal reaction by the Brazilian
firm will depend on the competitive conditions in the EC market.
5 See, for instance, the survey by Goldberg and Knetter (1997).
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2.4.2 Could and/or should the EC have used
only post-devaluation data?
The fact that a devaluation may importantly affect the incentives to
dump raises the general question of how such changes should be taken
into account, if they occur during the POI. In particular, will the pur-
pose of the AD agreement be served if duties are imposed in a situation
where dumping has occurred during part of the POI, but has ceased
during the POI due to a structural change in market conditions?
It seems highly reasonable to view the general purpose of the AD to
be to affect market outcomes: this much is clear from Art. VI.2, which
states that the purpose is ‘‘to offset or prevent’’ dumping, and from
Art. 11.1 AD, which states that
[a]n anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the
extent necessary to counteract dumping which is causing injury.
By the same token, Arts. 11.2 and 11.3 AD make it plain that it is ongo-
ing and not past injury that will be counteracted through the imposition
of antidumping duties. Moreover, Art. 9.3 AD states that at no point in
time will the level of antidumping duties exceed the dumping margin.
Indeed, a WTO Member could be obliged to reimburse duties received
if, as a result of changes in the normal value or other factors affecting
the extent of the dumping margin, the duties imposed are higher than
the actual dumping margin (Art. 9.3.3 AD).
Given that the purpose is to affect market outcomes, we can dis-
tinguish between the use of AD duties to offset ongoing dumping, or as
retaliation for past dumping (this possibly serving as a deterrent against
future dumping).
If the AD allows duties to be imposed as retaliation, the Brazilian
argument does not seem to have much merit  having established
dumping, the EC is correct to impose duties. But we do not see this
as a plausible interpretation. It seems more appropriate to view AD
duties as instruments for correcting ongoing dumping. Members should
therefore not be allowed to impose duties when dumping no longer
exists, since there is then nothing to ‘‘offset or prevent.’’6
6 Indeed, if AD duties were meant to counteract already-incurred injury, then a lump-sum
payment (equivalent to the amount of the injury suffered) would be most appropriate.
This, of course, is not the case. In fact, the AD agreement includes a very elaborate
scheme to ensure that variations in future dumping margins will not be over-penalized.
Everything in the agreement indicates that duties are conceived to be a means to ensure
that dumping will not occur in the future.
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Assuming that our understanding is correct, the next question is
whether devaluation may be of such a nature as to make part of the
POI simply irrelevant in determining whether antidumping duties
serve their objective function, that is, to stop ongoing and future
injurious dumping. This is how we understand the argument by Brazil
in this respect: since devaluation occurred during the last three months
of the POI, all previous comparisons are now irrelevant for the purpose
of imposing antidumping duties. We have sympathy for this point,
but before explaining why, we want to stress that we simply cannot
tell whether in this dispute a dumping margin was actually established
for the post-devaluation period. Brazil argued that this was indeed
the case, but the Panel and the AB have neither endorsed nor rejected
this point.
There are several reasons why we have sympathy for Brazil’s
claim. First, it could perhaps be argued that the practical significance
of its claim is questionable, since, even if the duties are imposed
with the full understanding that the dumping has ceased, they will
eventually be reimbursed. However, we do not believe that such
a reimbursement, even if made to the full amount of duties paid,
would fully compensate the exporter. The exporting firm, when duties
are imposed on it, typically cannot lower its price to keep the price
in the importing country constant in terms of the local currency,
and as a result will lose market share. It may be very costly for the firm
to regain its market share when the duties are eventually lifted.
It is therefore not at all immaterial (from the firms’ perspective) whether
the importing country is barred from imposing duties or is allowed
to do so but required to reimburse the duties received at some
future date. Hence, Brazil’s claim does concern an issue of
practical significance.
Second, to see the unreasonableness of the EC position, assume that
a significant devaluation occurred in the second month of a one-year-
long POI. Assume further that, after the devaluation, dumping has
ceased. A very formalistic and, we dare say, contextual, reading of the
POI would argue in favor of using both pre- and post-devaluation data
to calculate the dumping margin. But is such a calculation consonant
with bona fides? How can the EC authority, in the face of data suggesting
that for the 11 most recent months of investigation no dumping has
been found, still impose duties because a dumped transaction occurred
at the beginning of the POI? How is the very purpose of antidumping
duties served through such practices?
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The opposite scenario should of course also be addressed: what if
the devaluation occurred in the last part of the POI? Indeed, this scenario
is not that far from what actually occurred in the present case. We believe
that in such a situation, an investigating authority should either continue
investigating or drop the process altogether. The first alternative is very
much an option: the length of the POI is not mandated in the
AD Agreement; even assuming that the suggested length for the POI
is legally binding (as it appears to be in an Antidumping Committee
[ADP] Recommendation),7 nothing in the ADP Recommendation
obliges investigating authorities to stop investigating after six months.
Indeed, the POI is but a tool to serve the overall objective that the
7 See WTO Doc. G/ADP/6. On this issue, past case law is far from coherent. The panel
report on United States  Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan
(WTO Doc. WT/DS184/R of 28 February 2001) takes the view that the ADP Recom-
mendation on the length of the POI on injury is a nonbinding instrument. Accordingly, in
the Panel’s view, all obligations of investigating authorities with respect to the length
of the POI have to be found in the AD Agreement itself. We quote footnote 152 of the
report:
We note that the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices recently adopted a recom-
mendation which provides that ‘‘the period of data collection for injury investigation
normally should be at least three years’’. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices,
Recommendation concerning the Periods of Data Collection for Anti-Dumping
Investigations, adopted by the Committee on 5 May 2000, G/ADP/6. We note, however,
that this recommendation was adopted after the investigation at issue in this dispute had
been completed. Moreover, the recommendation is a non-binding guide to the common
understanding of Members on appropriate implementation of the ADAgreement.
It does not, however, add new obligations, nor does it detract from the existing obli-
gations of Members under the Agreement. See G/ADP/M/7 at para 40, G/ADP/AHG/R/7
at para. 2. Thus, any obligations as to the length of the period of investigation must,
if they exist, be found in the Agreement itself.
The Panel on Argentina  Definitive Antidumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil
(WT/DS241/R of 22 April 2003), takes an opposite view, showing considerable deference
towards the ADP Recommendation on the length of the POI when evaluating the injury:
Furthermore, we note that the issue of periods of review has been examined by the Anti-
Dumping Committee. It has issued a recommendation to the effect that, as a general
rule, ‘‘the period of data collection for injury investigations normally should be at least
three years, unless a party from whom data is being gathered has existed for a lesser
period, and should include the entirety of the period of data collection for the dumping
investigation’’ (emphasis added). It would appear, therefore, that the period of review
for injury need only ‘‘include’’ the entirety of the period of review for dumping.
There is nothing in the Anti-Dumping Committee’s recommendation to suggest that
it should not exceed (in the sense of including more recent data) the period of review
for dumping.
(x 7.287, emphasis in the original).
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imposition of antidumping duties is intended to serve. It should be used
for this purpose and for this purpose only. A significant devaluation is a
strong indication, in and of itself, that dumping may cease. Extending the
POI will allow an investigating authority to ensure that this has indeed
been the case. At any rate, by not extending the POI, an authority risks
punishing the exporter for behavior that is not current behavior, let alone
future behavior. In other words, it risks using the AD Agreement for a
purpose other than that which it is supposed to serve. This is abus de droit
and should be explicitly discouraged.
Would the text of Art. VI.2 GATT and the AD then allow the
interpretation proposed by Brazil, if found desirable on more general
grounds? The AB did not address the question of whether the EC could
have taken account of only the last part of the POI: The Brazilian claim
concerned an obligation in Art. VI.2 for the EC to use a particular
methodology, and not an obligation stemming from Art. 2.4.2 AD.
Having dismissed the existence of such an obligation stemming from
Art. VI.2 GATT, the AB did not have to deal with the question of whether
the method suggested by Brazil was permitted under Art. 2.4.2 AD.
As far as we can see, however, nothing would prevent the EC from
taking into account the devaluation if they so wanted. As stated in
Art. 2.4.2 AD:
A normal value established on a weighted average basis may be compared
to prices of individual export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of
export prices which differ significantly among different. . . time periods . . .
(emphasis added)
Then, was the EC obliged to take the devaluation into account? This
is less clear. The AB asserts (x 76) that the phrase ‘‘to offset or prevent
dumping’’ in the Art. VI.2 sentence,
In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on
any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than
the margin of dumping . . .
should be read to mean only that duties cannot exceed the dumping
margins. But this interpretation seems to make the phrase void of
meaning. To illustrate, suppose that this phrase did not exist, and that
the sentence in Art. VI.2 instead read:
A contracting party may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping
duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping . . .
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In our view, this would not make any difference to the ambit of the
provision. The AB’s interpretation thus seems to deprive the words
‘‘to offset or prevent’’ of any impact, and is therefore questionable as
such. In addition, it seems reasonable to see the purpose of AD duties
in the GATT to be to offset existing and future dumping (as opposed
to past dumping), and the reading suggested by Brazil would be
compatible with this.
Still, Art. 2.4.2 AD, first sentence, does not establish a hierarchy
among the two methodologies that in principle can be used, and the
second sentence clearly explains that the methodology embedded there
should primarily be understood as an additional weapon in the arsenal
of the investigating authority (as Brazil seems to suggest). Moreover, it is
clear that, according to this provision, its use is a matter of discretion 
it is stated that the second method ‘‘may’’ be employed.
Furthermore, even assuming that in the cases mentioned in this
second sentence there is an obligation to use the transaction-to-
weighted-average methodology, Brazil seems not to have explained
why this should always be the case in a devaluation scenario. As noted
above, it is not self-evident that a devaluation will affect dumping
margins, even if it is likely to do this.
2.4.3 Specific remarks on the AB report
(1) The AB maintains in x 76 that:
[t]he precise rules relating to the determination as to whether there is
dumping . . . are set out in Article 2 of the Antidumping Agreement . . .
This is obviously correct insofar as it goes. However, this raises
the question of what to do when the rules, detailed as they are,
threaten to lead to the imposition of AD duties in a situation where
dumping no longer occurs. As noted above, the AB asserts that this
would violate Art. 11.1 AD. However, we fail to see what would
prevent such duties from being imposed in any event, if only to
be later reimbursed. A mechanical application of the methodology
described in Art. 2 AD would lead to such imposition, regardless
of whether it is obvious to anyone that there is no longer any
dumping to offset or prevent.
(2) The AB discusses in xx 7477 whether Art. VI.2 GATT obliged the
EC to use a specific methodology, and to use data only from
the post-devaluation period, when determining the export prices.
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It concludes in x 77 that this is not the case. If it wanted to,
the AB could have stopped here. But it continues with a discussion
of what it sees as unreasonable implications if one were to adopt
Brazil’s suggestion of letting the POI be sensitive to changes in
market conditions.
First, the AB claims that Brazil’s proposal would lead to the
unreasonable consequence that ‘‘. . . the determination would have
to be based on the data of a very short period of time’’ (x 78).
An alternative and, in our view, a much more reasonable conclusion
would be that, faced with a major structural change that is likely
to have a major impact on any assessed dumping margins,
the investigating authority would have to wait for some time to
collect data to ensure that dumping also occurs after the structural
change. After all, the data before it, limited as it is, might suggest
that there is no longer dumping. It does not seem unreasonable
to request the importing country to restrain its trigger-happiness
in such a case.
Second, while noting that the AD does not stipulate any
particular length of the POI, the AB emphasizes the importance of
not opening a door for importing countries to manipulate its
length. We fully agree with this, of course. But consistency is
desirable only so long as it leads to reasonable outcomes, and that
seems questionable in this case. The AB argues that in the case of a
revaluation, the investigating authority could make an affirmative
finding of dumping based on data covering a very short period of
time. We are not convinced that this need occur, however. It does
not seem unreasonable to request of an affirmative finding that the
data on which it is based cover a sufficiently long period to be
deemed representative of the current situation.
(3) The AB notes in x 82 that neither the EC nor the Panel had
confirmed the Brazilian claim that any dumping that may once have
existed had ceased with the devaluation. The AB here argues that
one cannot take for granted the consequence of devaluation:
The lasting impact of a devaluation will therefore have to be determined
on the basis of objective and reliable post-devaluation data . . .
(x 82)
This seems entirely sensible, in our view. But it raises the question
of whether a Member, knowing that a very significant devaluation has
occurred, and lacking data on its impact, should be permitted to impose
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AD duties based on older, and most likely not very informative, data.
More data can be collected only through extra time in the POI.
2.5 Conclusion
The argument that the POI may have to be adjusted to take into
consideration fundamental changes in market conditions seems highly
reasonable, and doing so would not seem to violate the AD or the
GATT. It should be noted, however, that accepting this general principle
does not mean taking a stand on whether, in this specific dispute,
any dumping had ceased to exist.
The adjudicating bodies were, in our view, probably right to dismiss
Brazil’s claim, since Brazil did not clearly make the point that devalua-
tion, as such, should oblige an investigating authority to defer imposi-
tion of duties until more reliable data has been collected. But we would,
on more principled grounds, have preferred to see a different outcome.8
3 How should data from periods with ‘‘low sales’’ be treated?
A second issue on appeal concerned the use of data from a period
with ‘‘low sales.’’ The relevant provisions in the AD follow. Article 2.2
AD reads:
When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of
trade in the domestic market of the exporting country or when, because
of the particular market situation or the low volume of the sales in the
domestic market of the exporting country,2 such sales do not permit a
proper comparison, the margin of dumping shall be determined by com-
parison with a comparable price of the like product when exported to an
appropriate third country, provided that this price is representative, or
with the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable
amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits.
Footnote 2, appearing in the body of Art. 2.2 AD, reads:
Sales of the like product destined for consumption in the domestic
market of the exporting country shall normally be considered a sufficient
quantity for the determination of the normal value if such sales
constitute 5 per cent or more of the sales of the product under considera-
tion to the importing Member, provided that a lower ratio should be
8 It seems to us that Brazil could have used a non-violation complaint as well to make
this point.
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acceptable where the evidence demonstrates that domestic sales at such
lower ratio are nonetheless of sufficient magnitude to provide for a proper
comparison.
Finally, Art. 2.2.2 AD deals with the calculation of selling, general
and administrative (SG&A) costs and profit in the context of con-
structed price:
For the purpose of paragraph 2, the amounts for administrative, selling
and general costs and for profits shall be based on actual data pertaining
to production and sales in the ordinary course of trade of the like product
by the exporter or producer under investigation. When such amounts
cannot be determined on this basis, the amounts may be determined
on the basis of:
(i) the actual amounts incurred and realized by the exporter or
producer in question in respect of production and sales in the
domestic market of the country of origin of the same general category
of products;
(ii) the weighted average of the actual amounts incurred and realized
by other exporters or producers subject to investigation in respect
of production and sales of the like product in the domestic market
of the country of origin;
(iii) any other reasonable method, provided that the amount for profit
so established shall not exceed the profit normally realized by other
exporters or producers on sales of products of the same general
category in the domestic market of the country of origin.
3.1 The Panel’s findings
In the dispute, the EC discarded actual normal prices, and instead
employed constructed normal prices. The WTO Members are requested
by Art. 2.2 AD to do this if, inter alia, the total volume of sales of
the exporting firm is low in its domestic market (defined as such if
sales in the home market are less than 5% of the sales destined to
the market of the WTO Member investigating the allegations of
dumping). However, when constructing the price, the EC used data
from ‘‘low-volume’’ sales to calculate the SG&A costs as well as the
profit margin.
The Panel found (x 7.137, op. cit.) that the EC did not violate its
obligations under the AD Agreement, since low-volume sales are made
in the ordinary course of trade and the relevant provision (Art. 2.2.2,
see infra in subsection 2.2.3) explicitly requires WTO Members,
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when constructing the normal value, to use data relating to transactions
in the ordinary course of trade.
3.2 The AB’s findings
Brazil contested this finding by the Panel. In its view, the EC could
not use data it had previously discarded. Instead, when constructing the
price, the EC should have used data other than that existing in the
‘‘low-volume’’ sales to calculate SG&A and profit:
The issue before us, therefore, is whether an investigating authority
must exclude data from low-volume sales when determining the amounts
for SG&A and profits under the chapeau of Article 2.2.2, having
disregarded such low-volume sales for normal value determination
under Article 2.2.9 (x 92).
The AB summarizes its interpretation of Art. 2.2 AD as follows:
Article 2.2 makes clear that an alternative basis for deriving ‘‘normal
value’’ must be relied upon by an investigating authority where one
of three conditions exists:
(a) there are no sales in the exporting country of the like product in the
ordinary course of trade; or
(b) sales in the exporting country’s market do not ‘‘permit a proper
comparison’’ because of ‘‘the particular market situation’’; or
(c) sales in the exporting country’s market do not ‘‘permit a proper
comparison’’ because of their low volume.
Where one of these conditions exists, Article 2.2 further specifies two
alternative bases for the calculation of ‘‘normal value’’:
(a) third-country sales, that is, the comparable price of the like product
when exported to an ‘‘appropriate’’ third country, provided the price
is ‘‘representative’’; or
(b) constructed normal value, that is, the sum of:
(i) the cost of production in the country of origin;
(ii) a ‘‘reasonable amount’’ for SG&A; and
(iii) a ‘‘reasonable amount’’ for profits. (xx 94-5)
9 We should probably note here that, whereas the reader can admire the clarity of
expression in the quoted paragraph, this is not likely the case with the remaining
paragraphs of this subsection. In particular, x 86 of the report is a monument of
self-contradiction.
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The AB upholds the Panel’s findings concerning the use of
‘‘low-volume’’ sales data for the construction of a normal price, for
the following reasons:
1. In the AB’s view, the absence of explicit language in the body of
Art. 2.2.2, second sentence, AD prohibiting the use of data taken
from ‘‘low-volume’’ sales in the calculation of SG&A and profit
when constructing the price must mean something: if such use is
not prohibited, it is by inference allowed (x 98).
2. The AB also finds support for its reading of Art. 2.2.2 by examining
the absence of specific language in that Article within the context of
the AD Agreement: the AD Agreement is characterized, in the AB’s
view, by its very detailed expression. Thus, the absence of specific
language supporting Brazil’s claim is evidence of the negotiators’
intention not to disallow practices similar to those employed by the
EC (x 99).
3. Prior case law supports the AB’s interpretation (x 100).
4. ‘‘Low-volume’’ sales are sales in the ordinary course of trade and the
EC action is hence in full compliance with Art. 2.2.2, first sentence,
AD (x 101).
3.3 Discussion
The adjudicating bodies’ reasoning is logical so long as the relevant
provisions are read in isolation from their context: Art. 2.2.2 AD
refers only to the ‘‘ordinary course of trade’’ (OCT), and as long as
the transactions are in the OCT, they should consequently be included
in a calculation under this provision. But while this interpretation
is logical when Art. 2.2.2 AD is read without regard to its context
(the remaining provisions of the AD Agreement), it is somewhat
unsatisfactory in that it sidesteps the more fundamental issue raised by
Brazil: under what circumstances may information that is discarded
under one provision be used under another?
Starting at a more technical level, the determination by the adjudi-
cating bodies rests on their interpretation and application of the
OCT concept. This concept is essentially treated as independent of
the concept of ‘‘low sales.’’ A highly textual reading of the AD supports
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this view: Art. 2.2 AD allows for the possibility of low sales volumes
being in the OCT in its first sentence:
When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade
in the domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of. . . .
the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting
country, such sales do not permit a proper comparison. . . (emphasis
added, footnote omitted)
Furthermore, the only guidance the AD Agreement provides con-
cerning the interpretation of OCT is reflected in Art. 2.2.1 AD, which
states the minimum sales volume necessary for an investigating
authority to be allowed to discard data showing (roughly speaking)
pricing below cost in the domestic market, as being not in the OCT.
Hence, as far as the text is concerned, any other situation would be
in the OCT, including situations with low sales volume. One may even
argue that Art. 2.2.1 AD, strictly speaking, implies that with suffi-
ciently low sales volumes, the transactions must be regarded as being
in the OCT, since the condition for discarding them is not fulfilled.
Yet another argument to this effect would be that Art. 2.2. AD implies
that transactions can either be non-OCT or be low-volume, but not
both, since the Article does not include an ‘‘and.’’ Hence, if the data
is low-volume, it must be in the OCT.
In our view, this highly textual reading is not the appropriate
way of evaluating Brazil’s claim. By virtue of the principle of effective
treaty interpretation (the guiding interpretative principle, as recog-
nized by the AB in its case law in all reports since 1995), it simply
cannot be that data which is not useful (reliable) under Art. 2.2 AD,
suddenly becomes, without any further scrutiny, useful under
Art. 2.2.2 AD.
Before describing this view in more detail, we want to point out
that the issue at stake, more generally, concerns the incentives for the
investigating authority to construct prices based on actual data, rather
than to use actual data as such. The price-construction route has
a couple of significant attractions for such authorities: once data on
SG&A and profits are considered to be in low volumes, Art. 2.2 AD
permits the export price to be compared with the cost of production
in the country of origin, plus a reasonable amount for SG&A and for
profits. The computation shall, with regard to the latter two price
components, ‘‘be based on’’ actual data from the ordinary course
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of trade. Hence, the investigating authority can deviate from the data
supplied and construct a price with all the discretion that the notion
‘‘be based on’’ allows. This is likely in practice to give an oppor-
tunity to manipulate the established dumping margin upwards and
save administrative resources by avoiding the undertaking of a
thorough determination of the actual price. But such a practice would
violate the ‘‘object and purpose’’ of the AD to perform a fair price
comparison (as explicitly enshrined in Art. 2.4 AD), and an inter-
pretation of the provisions in Art. 2 AD must take these possibilities
into account.
3.3.1 The purpose of the ‘‘low-volume’’ concept
According to a textual and contextual reading of the AD Agreement,
once the requirements of any one of the three grounds (mentioned in
Art. 2.2 AD) justifying a rejection of normal value have been met,
an investigating authority can construct the price. In so doing, it must:
(i) respect the requirements of Art. 2.2.1.1 AD as far as the construc-
tion of the production cost is concerned; and
(ii) respect the requirements of Art. 2.2.2 AD as far as the construction
of SG&A and profit are concerned.
These requirements are applicable here, since, according to Art. 2.2 AD,
a constructed price is composed of the abovementioned three elements,
that is, production cost, SG&A, and profit.
There are at least two possible reasons why the AD includes the
‘‘low-volume’’ provision. One is that an exporter may deliberately
charge lower prices in the domestic market than what would be
motivated from the point of view of demand and production cost
considerations in this market, in order to escape a dumping finding
in the export market. Such behavior is costly in itself, but if the profits
in the domestic market are very small anyway relative to those in the
export market, such behavior might be profitable.
The other reason that occurs to us for including the ‘‘low sales’’
provision is to prevent the use of data that is not representative due
to a limited number of observations on transactions. Market prices
are influenced by a number of factors, and for this reason, may
fluctuate depending on the particular economic ‘‘shocks’’ that hit the
market at any particular moment. When prices fluctuate, it is necessary
to compute some form of average price to use as a comparison.
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This average can be computed with a high degree of confidence when
the computation is done on the basis of a large number of observed
transactions, collected from a period during which there are no
structural changes affecting the industry, and when the data is applied
to a subsequent period in which the structural factors remain the same.
However, with very few transactions to base the calculation upon,
random factors will have a large impact on the calculated normal price.
Article 2.2 AD can be seen as recognizing this fact in its acknowledg-
ment of the possibility that, because of low volumes, it may not be
possible to compute a ‘‘proper’’ normal price.
We find it difficult to dismiss either of these two explanations for the
‘‘low sales’’ criterion completely. Speaking in favor of the first inter-
pretation (which does as such not contradict the second), is the fact that
a low volume is defined as a fraction of sales, rather than some absolute
number, which would be more relevant with regard to the number of
observations argument. However, we take for granted that the
antidumping instrument in the WTO should only be used when
there is a high degree of certainty concerning the existence of dump-
ing (its imposition should be fair as per Art. 2.4 AD). To ensure that
this is indeed the case, it is of paramount importance that, during
the dumping investigation, the investigating authority employ reliable
data. Indeed, the AD Agreement says as much when it states in the body
of Art. 2.2 AD ‘‘. . . such sales do not permit a proper comparison.’’
We thus tend to see the desire to base AD measures on statistically
reliable calculations as an overriding concern of the AD, and that
the specific provisions of the agreement must be read in light of
this concern.
3.3.2 The AB’s neglect of the term ‘‘like’’ in Art. 2.2.2 DSU
Viewing the purpose of the low-sales-volume concept as motivated by
a desire to use statistically reliable data, the outcome of the dispute
with regard to the low-volume argument by Brazil is clearly unsatis-
factory. If data is of insufficient quality to be used for a certain purpose,
the very same data cannot become reliable for the same purpose under
another provision.
Technically speaking, the problem with the adjudicating bodies’
determination is, as we see it, their neglect of the term ‘‘like product’’
in Art. 2.2.2 AD, which is highly suggestive of the circumstances
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under which the provision would be applied. To recall, the first sentence
reads:
For the purpose of paragraph 2, the amounts for administrative, selling
and general costs and for profits shall be based on actual data pertaining
to production and sales in the ordinary course of trade of the like product
by the exporter or producer under investigation. (emphasis added)
In the GATT/WTO context, this concept invariably refers to a compar-
ison of separate products. It is used to limit the ambit of provisions to
situations where these distinct products have very similar (or possibly
identical) features. Indeed, the term ‘‘like product’’ is defined in
Art. 2.6 AD as follows:
Throughout this Agreement the term ‘‘like product’’ (‘‘produit
similaire’’) shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical,
i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the
absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike
in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product
under consideration. (emphasis added)
In the present dispute, the adjudicating bodies  the Panel offering
a full analysis and the AB confirming  first examined what the term
‘‘like product’’ meant in the context of the AD Agreement. Then, the
Panel and the AB adopted a very formal reading of this provision,
maintaining that data from the same product, previously discarded
under Art. 2.2 AD, could now be used in the context of an Art. 2.2.2 AD.
Indeed, they might have argued, what could be more ‘‘like’’ than sheer
identity? However, to the best of our knowledge, nowhere in WTO law
is the concept used to refer to the same physical item.
Why is this of significance here? Because the methodology employed
by the EC, and accepted by the AB, is to interpret the requirement in
Art. 2.2.2 AD that the SG&A and profit data should stem from a like
product to allow the EC to use data from the very same product. This
fundamentally violates the notion that likeness involves a comparison
of physically separate products. If negotiators intended the Art. 2.2.2 AD
calculation to be done with data from the same transactions that were
discarded under Art. 2.2 AD, would they not have made this explicit
in the agreement? It is striking how differently the AB interprets silence
in different provisions: sometimes it means something, and sometimes
it means nothing, but the reasons for the particular position taken
in this regard are not explained.
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Of course, one cannot exclude the possibility that some price-
elements (like the SG&A and/or profit) can legitimately be used, even if
the price (comprising, we repeat, production costs, SG&A, and profits)
as such has been discarded. But whereas all information concerning all
price elements of another but like product can be legitimately used (since
information concerning a non-investigated transaction, by definition
does not suffer from the flaws enshrined in Art. 2.2 AD), only a sub-set
of the information can be used when it stems from the physically
identical product. For, if one were to take the opposite point of
view, one would have to ipso facto accept that improper data under
Art. 2.2 AD suddenly becomes proper under one of its subparagraphs
that aims to ‘‘flesh out’’ how investigating authorities should behave
when making use of the institutional possibility offered to them under
this provision. The more plausible interpretation is that negotiators
understood Art. 2.2.2 AD to be applicable in situations where, because
the use of certain data on transactions is likely to be beset with statistical
problems due to the limited number of observations, or due to special
circumstances, Members could use SG&A and profit data from other
transactions, as long as these transactions involved products with
sufficiently similar features (hence, the reference to the ‘‘like’’ good).
To conclude, when determining the SG&A as well as profits, the
investigating authority cannot, in our view, use the same data discarded
under Art. 2.2 AD. It has to use data from other transactions.
3.3.3 The AB’s interpretation of the intent of negotiators
A central point in the AB’s argument is the fact that Art. 2.2.2 AD lacks
the reference to low-volume sales that is contained in Art. 2.2 AD,
and that this difference cannot be disregarded:
Considering that the treaty negotiators covered in great detail various
aspects of the constructed value calculation, the omission of any reference
to low-volume sales in the chapeau of Article 2.2.2 is telling.
(x 99)
To this paragraph there is a footnote stating that:
[u]nlike the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code, the present Anti-Dumping
Agreement identifies low-volume sales as a basis for constructing normal
value, including the footnote to Article 2.2 specifically defining low-
volume sales in the home market in relation to a proportion of sales made
in the importing Member. (Footnote 2 to Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping
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Agreement) This reinforces our view that a reference to ‘‘low-volume’’
sales should not be implied when such reference is not expressly stated.
The AB here claims that the lack of explicit reference to low-volume
sales in Art. 2.2.2 AD must signal a desire on the part of the negotiators
of the agreement that the two situations be treated differently in this
respect. But why would negotiators on the one hand expressly recognize
the possibility that data collected during periods of low volume may be
unreliable, and that therefore a different method may be used to find
the normal value, but then allow that the same problem arises in this
alternative method, which was chosen in order to prevent this problem?
The AB might respond that it is bound by the text when ruling on
Brazil’s appeal, and this is what the text says (even though this might
also be challenged). But to interpret the intent of the negotiators to
allow for this illogical construction seems to go too far. A much more
likely reason for the construction seems to be that the problem with
poor data (which is a generic problem when the data only includes
a few observations) is already addressed in Art. 2.2 AD.
3.3.4 What should the AB have done?
We do not know for certain what data Brazil supplied to the EC.
One possibility is that the EC was first provided with data directly
specifying prices, and when these were discarded, it obtained data that
would allow the EC to construct the price on the basis of information
on production costs, SG&A, and normal profits. If this is what actually
occurred, the EC procedure could in principle be defended at least
from a normative point of view. It could possibly be argued that the
price data is less reliable from a statistical point of view than the
constructed price data.10
On the other hand, the case would look very different if the EC
denounced the same data as not useful for a computation directly
under Art. 2.1 AD, as it employs for the calculation under Art. 2.2.2 AD.
(There are other instances in the report that lead us believe this is
what actually occurred, such as Recitals 170172.) This would be
a strong indication that the EC is choosing to construct a price,
10 Such a situation may arise when the statistical problems with the data mainly stem from
disturbances on the demand side, such as fluctuating demand. In such a situation, it is
possible, at least in principle, that a more reliable ‘‘normal’’ price could be obtained
by aggregating price elements, where the profits would be ‘‘normal’’ profits, as opposed
to realized profits.
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rather than to use the price supplied by Brazil, for the abovementioned
non-legitimate reasons. In order to determine the reason for the EC’s
choice, we would need to know exactly which data it retained, and which
it discarded.
We emphasize again that we do not know why the EC chose to
construct the price. What we miss in the AB’s analysis, however,
is a discussion of what is required for a price to be ‘‘constructed’’ in an
appropriate fashion. There is a tension between data first being
discarded under one provision, and then being used under another
provision that is more attractive to the investigating authority. In our
view, the AB did not appropriately take into account the possibility of
an importing country misusing the constructed-price route.
More specifically, we believe that, had the AB sufficiently accounted
for the rationale for, and the context of, Art. 2.2.2 AD, it would have
been led to an opposite conclusion from what it decided. Should the AB,
in light of Brazil’s claim, have first examined what data was at stake?
In this part of the discussion, it should have made a distinction between
price and price elements. It should then have proceeded to examine
whether the EC used some or all three of the elements discarded under
Art. 2.2 AD. It would then naturally have moved to a discussion of
whether previously discarded data could still be legitimately utilized,
and if yes, under what conditions, in the context of an antidumping
investigation. If this were indeed the case, the AB would have found
that the only scenario which allows a WTO Member to use previously
discarded data is the scenario we indicated supra: when a subset of the
discarded data is used. Otherwise, under Art. 2.2.2 AD, a WTO Member
would have to construct the price utilizing data from a non-investigated,
but like product.
4 Did the EC take proper account of the ‘‘growth factor’’?
Brazil complained before the Panel that the EC’s final determination
did not contain a separate examination of whether there was injury
to industry growth. Article 3.4 AD mentions ‘‘growth’’ among the factors
indicating injury, and, according to consistent case law, all factors
mentioned in Art. 3.4 AD must be examined by an investigating
authority. The EC counterargument was that implicitly, the EC had
examined growth and this conclusion was obvious when reading the
determination.
ec  antidumping duties on iron tube or pipe fittings 109
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745606001418
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 16:32:39, subject to the Cambridge Core
4.1 The Panel’s findings
The Panel held that, while investigating authorities must perform
a substantive examination of all factors mentioned in Art. 3.4 AD, they
do not have to provide separate findings for each individual factor.
The Panel found that the test of Art. 3.4 AD could still be satisfied
even in the absence of explicit separate findings, as long as an adjudi-
cating body could conclude that a substantive review of all factors
mentioned in Art. 3.4 AD had indeed occurred. In pertinent part,
the Panel found:
The facts on the record of the investigation and taken into account in the
EC injury analysis indicate to us that, in its examination of other injury
factors  in particular, sales, profits, output, market share, productivity
and capacity utilisation  satisfy us that, in addressing developments in
relation to these other factors in the manner that it did in this particular
investigation, the European Communities implicitly addressed the factor
of ‘‘growth.’’
We therefore find that the European Communities did not violate its
obligations under Article 3.4 in its treatment of ‘‘growth’’ and that it at
least addressed each of the listed Article 3.4 factors.
(xx 7.310311 of the Panel report, op. cit.)
4.2 The AB’s findings
Brazil appealed the Panel’s finding concerning the EC’s treatment of
the ‘‘growth factor.’’ The AB explained its understanding of the issue
before it as follows:
The participants in this appeal do not dispute that it is mandatory for
investigating authorities to evaluate all of the fifteen injury factors listed
in Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. One of the fifteen factors
expressly listed in Article 3.4 is the ‘‘actual and potential negative effects
on . . . growth.’’ The issue raised by Brazil in this appeal is whether the
requirements of Article 3.4 were satisfied in this case, even though the
factor ‘‘growth’’ was evaluated only ‘‘implicitly’’ and no separate record
of its evaluation was made.
(x 156, italics in the original)
The AB upheld the Panel’s findings in this respect on two grounds
(x 166): on the one hand, it held the view that Art. 3.4 AD does not
prejudge the manner in which the factors listed there will be examined.
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They all have to be examined, but an implicit, albeit verifiable, review
suffices by and large (xx 1601); on the other hand, in the AB’s view,
growth is a sui generis factor anyway, in the sense that it is to be found
implicitly in a series of other factors mentioned in Art. 3.4 AD (x 162).
For example, when reviewing pertinent parts of the EC final
determination, the AB mentioned specifically the following passage
from the EC Provisional Regulation:
The examination of the above mentioned injury factors shows that
the situation of the Community industry deteriorated. In particular, the
Community industry experienced a decline in production, production
capacity, sales and market share. Moreover, the Community industry
suffered a significant loss of employment and a decline in investments,
as well as an increase of stocks. As to the capacity utilization, its increase
depended on the reduced production capacity.
(x 165)
In the AB’s view, the ‘‘declines’’ and ‘‘losses’’ observed in the final
determination with respect to several of the factors examined in this case
are necessarily related to ‘‘growth’’ as well. In the AB’s view (x 165):
To put it more precisely, the negative trends in these factors point
to a lack of ‘‘growth.’’ This, in turn, supports the conclusion that the
European Commission evaluated this injury factor.
4.3 Discussion
The purpose of Art 3.4 AD is presumably to ensure that anti-dumping
duties are not imposed on the basis of a very narrow definition of
injury, in a situation where most other effects of the dumping are
positive for the importing country. This seems reasonable as such,
as long as Members have not agreed on a more precise definition of the
concept injury.
The difficulty with this approach, however, is that as long as no
guidance is given for how to weigh the different components, it becomes
rather useless to go through each and every one of them. The lowering
of prices by foreign competitors should, except under very special
circumstances, result in declines in domestic firms’ sales, profits, output,
market share, employment, wages, ability to raise capital, cash flow, etc.
Do not these effects suffice for all practical purposes to establish injury?
We are thus not convinced by the case law that makes it compulsory for
an investigating authority to examine all factors listed in Art. 3.4 AD.
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There is also a redundancy in the list provided in Art. 3.4 AD in another
respect: industry growth is obtained using data on industry production
at two different points in time. The list already includes actual
and potential output (and sales), and should therefore implicitly take
account of the industry growth factor.
We therefore agree with the AB’s determination from a more con-
ceptual point of view. We are also broadly in agreement at a more
textual level. The AD does not specify the manner in which the analysis
of the 15 factors in Art. 3.4 AD is to be conducted and reported.
On the other hand, in order for the requirement to examine all factors
to have any practical bite, it is probably necessary that the findings with
respect to each and every one be published. But this would be a pure
formality, in the absence of rules for how such analysis should be
conducted and, as mentioned above, for how the different findings
are to be aggregated.
Finally, due to the nature of the list in Art. 3.4 AD, it does not serve
any purpose to impose, as an obligation per se, a requirement of going
through all the factors mentioned there, as the AB has time and
again done in its case law, other than as some sort of an administrative
(bureaucratic) checkup. The factors mentioned in Art 3.4 AD reveal
their true purpose only when they are placed in the context of the non-
attribution exercise: by virtue of Art. 3.5 AD, a WTO Member wishing
to impose duties must first ensure that injury has been caused by
dumped imports and not by factors other than dumped imports.
The examination of the state of the industry, as mandated by Art. 3.4 AD,
should hence serve this perspective.
5 Individual examination of the impact of cumulated factors
A third substantial issue raised by Brazil was its claim that an
investigating authority, when opting for cumulation in accordance
with Art. 3.3 AD, first had to assess the impact of imports from
each and every WTO Member individually before reviewing their
combined effect.11
11 Under this provision, an investigating authority can cumulate the effect of dumped
imports from various sources and lawfully impose duties, even if, had the investigation’s
assessment had been conducted on a state-by-state, individual basis, the de minimis
thresholds established in the agreement would not have been met.
112 henrik horn and petros c. mavroidis
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745606001418
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 16:32:39, subject to the Cambridge Core
5.1 The Panel’s findings
The Panel rejected Brazil’s claim as follows:
The text of this provision [Article 3.3] contains no additional require-
ment that authorities shall also consider whether there has been a
significant increase in imports country-by-country before progressing to
a cumulative assessment.12
5.2 The issue before the AB
Brazil appealed this Panel finding on two grounds:
First, according to Brazil, the Panel erred in its interpretation
of Art. 3.3 AD. Brazil maintained its original point that for cumula-
tion to be lawfully carried out under the AD Agreement, an investi-
gating authority had to first examine the impact of imports from
each and every WTO Member under investigation individually.
Brazil found supporting evidence for such a reading of the pertinent
legal provision (Art. 3.3 AD) in its immediate context, i.e. in Art. 3.2
AD (x 105). The AB reformulated the Brazilian claim in the following
terms:
The issue before us is whether an investigating authority must first
analyze the volumes and prices of dumped imports on a country-by-
country basis under Article 3.2 as a pre-condition to cumulatively assess-
ing the effects of the dumped imports under Article 3.3.
(x 107)
Second, Brazil also argued that import volumes and prices could
not be cumulated: in its view, as expressed by the AB,
. . . import volumes and prices cannot be considered as ‘‘effects’’ of
imports; on the contrary, import volumes and prices ‘‘are precisely the
factors which may cause the effects envisaged by Article 3.4.’’ Brazil
therefore argues that import volumes and prices cannot be cumulated
under Article 3.3. It submits that the Panel’s contrary interpretation of
Articles 3.2 and 3.3 would permit an investigating authority to impose
anti-dumping duties on products from a country when those products,
in contrast to those from other countries, may not be causing injury
to the domestic industry.
(x 105)
12 See x 7.234 of the Panel report, op. cit.
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5.3 The AB’s response
The AB rejected in toto Brazil’s arguments in this respect (x 118).
With regard to the question of whether for cumulation to be lawfully
performed, an assessment of the impact of the exports of individual
firms is required, the AB started its analysis by first laying out the
relevant legal framework, that is Art. 3.3 AD:
Where imports of a product from more than one country are
simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations, the investigating
authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of such imports only
if they determine that (a) the margin of dumping established in relation
to the imports from each country is more than de minimis as defined
in paragraph 8 of Article 5 and the volume of imports from each
country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative assessment of the effects
of the imports is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition
between the imported products and the conditions of competition
between the imported products and the like domestic product. (italics
in the original)
The AB disagreed with Brazil’s claim on both textual and contextual
grounds. With respect to the text, the AB noted that there is no explicit
requirement in the body of Art. 3.3 AD requesting investigating author-
ities to perform individual assessment of imports before cumulating
them (x 110). As the AB noted:
The text of Article 3.3 expressly identifies three conditions that must
be satisfied before an investigating authority is permitted under the
Anti-Dumping Agreement to assess cumulatively the effects of imports
from several countries. These conditions are:
(a) the dumping margin from each individual country must be more than
de minimis;
(b) the volume of imports from each individual country must not be
negligible; and
(c) cumulation must be appropriate in the light of the conditions of
competition
(i) between the imported products; and
(ii) between the imported products and the like domestic product.
By the terms of Article 3.3, it is ‘‘only if’’ the above conditions are
established that an investigating authority ‘‘may’’ make a cumulative
assessment of the effects of dumped imports from several countries.
(x 109)
114 henrik horn and petros c. mavroidis
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745606001418
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 16:32:39, subject to the Cambridge Core
With respect to the contextual argument, the AB examined Art. 3.2 AD,
the provision cited by Brazil in support of its argument, which reads
as follows:
With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating
authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase
in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production
or consumption in the importing Member. With regard to the effect of
the dumped imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider
whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the dumped
imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing
Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress
prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise
would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of these
factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.
Once again, in the AB’s eyes, nothing in the body of Art. 3.2 AD
supported the conclusion drawn by Brazil that an individual assess-
ment before cumulation was required.
As to the second claim advanced by Brazil, the AB essentially rejected
it because, in its view, throughout Art. 3 AD, the terms ‘‘effects’’ and
‘‘factors’’ seemed to have been used interchangeably.
5.4 Discussion
Brazil’s claim that an individual assessment is required for cumulation
to lawfully take place is unsupported by the text of the Agreement 
The body of Art. 3.3 AD clearly reflects one obligation only: to cumu-
latively assess the effect of imports. There is no prerequisite to first
individually assess them as well. Hence, as a matter of positive law,
we agree with the AB.
As to Brazil’s second claim, that import volumes and prices cannot
be cumulated, we can observe that the plain language of Art. 3.5 AD
(which lays out the injury factors) contradicts the claim advanced
in this respect: import volumes and prices are among the ‘‘factors’’
explicitly laid down.
At a more normative and general level, the question of how to deal
with cumulation would be of no concern if any dumping margin
could be targeted through an antidumping duty. However, the first
sentence of Art. VI.1 GATT lays down the reason for an antidump-
ing measure  to prevent injury to a domestic industry. There are
thus two factors limiting the maximum permitted size of the
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antidumping duty: the dumping margin, as well as the injury caused
by this exporter’s dumping. It is then necessary not to attribute to
a particular exporter injury that is caused by other exporters (or by other
factors). But how to attribute such harm to individual exporters
is not a straightforward matter.
For instance, suppose that a firm in country A and a firm in
country B each sell a highly substitutable product to country C, and that
the cost and demand conditions in the two countries are the same,
so that they sell at the same price in their respective home markets.
Suppose that the injury to C is measured in terms of jobs lost. If only
one exporter dumps, domestic employment in the sector is reduced by
500 jobs, but if both dump, the reduction in jobs is 800. How would
the attribution be done in such a case? Or suppose that it suffices that
only one country dump for the entire domestic industry to be wiped
out, and both dump. One might then possibly argue that one of the
firms is not adding to the injury. But which one? As can be seen,
the question of attribution is far from trivial.
It is far beyond the scope of this chapter to suggest how to undertake
an individual attribution analysis. The more general point, however,
is that it is often not possible to perform an analysis on a country-
by-country basis. As is so often the case when conducting an economic/
statistical analysis, it is necessary to include all factors at the same
time in order to determine how they interact, and the contribution
to injury by each.
6 Causality analysis
Brazil complained before the Panel that the EC did not honor the
causality requirement laid down in Art. 3.5 AD, in two important
respects:
First, the EC did not take into account the relatively higher cost of
production for EC producers (compared to that of Brazilian producers)
as a cause of injury. In Brazil’s view, the EC should have taken this
factor, which was ‘‘known’’ to the investigating authority, into account.
Second, the EC did not perform a cumulative assessment of how
all factors other than dumped imports contributed to injury. Although
the EC did examine such factors individually and reached the conclu-
sion that they were not responsible for the injury caused, in Brazil’s
view, the EC was further required to perform a cumulative assessment
in addition to the individual assessment of such factors.
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6.1 The Panel’s findings
The Panel rejected both claims by Brazil. The first claim was rejected
on two grounds: Brazil had raised the ‘‘high-production-cost’’ factor
during a stage of the investigation other than the stage during which
the causality requirement was being discussed. As a result, the factor
was not ‘‘known’’ to the EC investigating authority when it should have
been, i.e. during the stage when the causality requirement was being
discussed. Second, when this factor was raised, the EC had indeed
examined it and dismissed its relevance in light of the marginal dif-
ference in production costs between Brazilian and EC producers (x 7.362
of the Panel report, op. cit.).
As to the second claim, it may be appropriate to cite verbatim the
Panel’s findings:
In its determination, the European Communities identified certain
factors, other than dumped imports, that were potentially causing injury
to the domestic industry including imports from third countries not
subject [to] the investigation; decline in consumption and substitution.
With respect to each of these factors individually, the European
Communities conducted a separate examination and found either that
it ‘‘is not such as to have contributed in any significant way to the
material injury suffered by the Community industry’’ (decline in con-
sumption); that it made ‘‘no significant contribution’’ (export perfor-
mance) or that ‘‘no significant influence’’ could have resulted (own
imports of the product concerned), that it cannot have significantly
contributed to injury (substitution), or (in the case of imports from
the countries not subject to the investigation) ‘‘even if imports from
other third countries may have contributed to the material injury
suffered by the Community industry, it is hereby confirmed that they
are not such to have broken the causal link between the dumping and the
injury found.’’ The European Communities concluded that any other
factors that may have contributed to the injury to the domestic industry
were ‘‘not such as to have broken the casual link’’ between dumped
imports and injury.
These aspects of the EC determination indicate to us that the European
Communities analysed individually the causal factors concerned and
identified the individual effects of each of these causal factors. With respect
to each of the factors, the European Communities concluded that the
extent of the contribution to injury was not significant, or, in one case,
extrapolated that, even if the effect were significant, it would not be
such as to ‘‘break the causal link’’ between dumped imports and
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material injury. The European Communities’ overall conclusion was
that none of these factors had an effect that was such to have broken
the causal link between dumped imports and material injury.
We are certainly aware of the theoretical possibility that a causation
methodology which separates and distinguishes between individual injury
factors may not accommodate the possibility that multiple ‘‘insignificant
factors’’ might collectively constitute a significant cause of injury such as
to sever the link between dumped imports and injury. However, the
EC methodology  which we understand to separate and distinguish
between the effects of each of these causal factors and the dumped
imports including through an examination as to whether the extent of
the effects of each causal factor are such that it is necessary to separate
and distinguish its effects  does not leave the effects of those factors
entirely lumped together and indistinguishable.
(xx 7.367369 of the Panel report, emphasis in the original)
Brazil appealed both findings.
6.2 The AB’s findings
The AB understood the first issue before it to be as follows:
The issue before us is whether, under Article 3.5, the alleged higher cost
of production of the European Communities industry, raised by the
Brazilian exporter solely in the context of the European Commission’s
dumping and injury determinations, was a ‘‘known factor[] other than
the dumped imports which at the same time [was] injuring the domestic
industry,’’ thereby requiring examination by the European Commission.
(x 173)
And the AB described the second issue thus:
The issue before us, therefore, is whether the non-attribution language of
Article 3.5 requires an investigating authority, in conducting its causality
analysis, to examine the effects of the other causal factors collectively after
having examined them individually.
(x 187, emphasis in the original)
The AB rejected both claims advanced by Brazil, albeit on different
grounds than those of the Panel. The AB discarded the Panel’s con-
clusion that, unless Brazil raised the factor at each and every stage of the
investigation, the factor at hand was not ‘‘known’’ to the investigating
authority. In the AB’s view, the fact that the factor was raised at some
stage made the factor known throughout the investigation (x 177).
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However, since the EC had dismissed its relevance (in light of the
aforementioned minute differences in cost structure among Brazilian
and EC producers), the AB held that the EC no longer had to account
for this factor during the investigation process.
The issue of whether there was an obligation to cumulate was more
complicated. The AB rejected the claim advanced by Brazil on burden-
of-proof grounds (x 195); the AB accepted that, in principle, there
could be cases where a cumulative assessment of the injury from factors
other than dumped imports might be necessary (xx 1912). In its view,
however, Brazil had not demonstrated why this was indeed the case
in the instant matter. In the absence of specific proof to this effect,
the AB upheld the Panel’s findings (x 194).
To reach this conclusion, the AB first recalled the pertinent part
of Art. 3.5 AD, which is the applicable legal provision in this context:
The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the
dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic
industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be
attributed to the dumped imports. (emphasis added by the AB in its report)
In the AB’s view, this language was necessary for non-attribution
purposes, and non-attribution was the objective of the causality require-
ment (x 188). The AB interpreted the non-attribution requirement in
the following way:
Non-attribution therefore requires separation and distinguishing of
the effects of other causal factors from those of the dumped imports so
that injuries caused by the dumped imports and those caused by other
factors are not ‘‘lumped together’’ and made ‘‘indistinguishable.’’
(x 188, footnote omitted)
At the same time, however, the AB noted that although the AD
Agreement was explicit as to the ends sought through Art. 3.5 AD
(non-attribution), it was silent as to the means to be used in pursuance
of the stated ends:
We underscored in US  Hot Rolled Steel, however, that the Anti-
Dumping Agreement does not prescribe the methodology by which an
investigating authority must avoid attributing the injuries of other causal
factors to dumped imports:
We emphasize that the particular methods and approaches by which
WTO Members choose to carry out the process of separating and
distinguishing the injurious effects of dumped imports from the
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injurious effects of the other known causal factors are not prescribed
by the Anti-Dumping Agreement. What the Agreement requires is simply
that the obligations in Article 3.5 be respected when a determination of
injury is made.
Thus, provided that an investigating authority does not attribute
the injuries of other causal factors to dumped imports, it is free to choose
the methodology it will use in examining the ‘‘causal relationship’’
between dumped imports and injury.
(x 189)
The AB did not delve into details of the methodology the EC
employed in the present case. Having established the purpose of the
causality requirement, as well as the absence of an obligation to use
a specific methodology to reach the stated purpose, the AB went on
to accept that, in principle, the Brazilian claim was valid. In the absence,
however, of any specific arguments to substantiate its claim, the AB
upheld the Panel’s findings, albeit on different grounds: while the Panel
saw no obligation to cumulate at all, the AB saw an obligation to
cumulate in some unspecified situations. Implicitly, therefore, the AB
admitted that there was no generic obligation imposed on WTO
Members to cumulate the effects of factors other than dumped imports
when performing their causality analysis; an individual examination
of the effects of known factors sufficed.
6.3 Discussion
With respect to Brazil’s first claim, we believe that the AB decision is
correct, but could have been taken one step further. The Panel’s finding
that factors have to be raised in each separate stage of the investigation
to be known to the investigating authority makes no sense, and
it imposes a considerable burden on exporters who might not even
know at which precise stage of the investigation they are since the
AD Agreement does not impose any specific obligations in this respect.
As a result, the ‘‘staging’’ of the procedure is a matter within the
discretion of the investigating authority, and diversified practice among
jurisdictions in this respect cannot a priori be excluded.
But the decision’s shortcoming, as we see it, is that it does not address
the fact that, after years and years of antidumping practice, GATT/WTO
case law still accepts the notion that only factors raised by the parties
are ‘‘known’’ to the investigating authority. This approach serves only
to make life easy for investigating authorities and might throw into
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question the soundness of the findings as such. Take, for example,
the present case: should not the EC authority, even in the absence of a
submission by the Brazilian exporter, motu proprio ask its own domestic
industry questions concerning its cost structure? It is remarkable that
case law turns a blind eye to the fact that an investigating authority must
first investigate before it judges the appropriateness of the imposition
of antidumping duties. The AB, strictly speaking, did not have to deal
with this issue, so we raise it simply as an obiter dictum.
On the second issue, however, a number of points can be raised.
One can first note that Brazil was apparently arguing that, with respect
to other factors that may explain injury, the EC should have taken
into account not only their individual impact, but also their aggregate
effect on injury.
First, we can note here that it is necessary in an economic/statistical
analysis to take into account the interaction between different explan-
atory variables, for the reason indicated in our discussion of the
‘‘cumulation’’ issue.
Second, there are problems with the reliance on the inherently
difficult concept of ‘‘causality’’ in several of the WTO agreements;
indeed, legal analysis outside the confines of WTO law is typically
quite weak in its treatment of causality: Roman law distinguished
between causa adequata (where the issue is to what extent a factor by
itself is sufficient to cause injury) and conditio sine qua non (where the
issue is to what extent a particular factor is necessary for injury to
occur). In legal practice, both tests have found application within
qualitative narratives. Some laws (like, for example, the EC antitrust
law) sometimes require very demanding causality tests: in its Wood
Pulp judgment for example, the Court of Justice of the EC imposed
a ‘‘but for’’ test on anyone wishing to demonstrate that a certain
practice had its origins in a cartel type of behavior. According to this
test, unless all other factors potentially explaining the behavior had
been previously rejected, no explanation based on a cartel theory would
have been demonstrated.13
The WTO case law is taking its first steps on this (quintessentially
philosophical) issue. In the present dispute, the AB (probably wisely)
refused to lay out how it understands causality in precise, operational
13 This test is, of course, very demanding on the investigating authority and, if taken
to its logical extreme, might lead to a proliferation of too few findings of illegalities,
and hence underenforcement of the contract.
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terms. What we find troubling, however, is the AB’s argument that
the EC methodology is acceptable, since the AD does not specify
any particular methodology to follow:
In contrast, we do not find that an examination of collective effects is
necessarily required by the non-attribution language of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. In particular, we are of the view that Article 3.5 does not
compel, in every case, an assessment of the collective effects of other causal
factors, because such an assessment is not always necessary to conclude
that injuries ascribed to dumped imports are actually caused by those
imports and not by other factors.
(x 191, emphasis in original)
What we fail to see is how it can be known that an analysis of
‘‘collective’’ effects would not add information concerning the sources
of injury without conducting the analysis.
In the AB’s defense, it can be said that Brazil did not seem to explain
in its appeal the reasons why the EC methodology was deficient. The AB,
applying the in dubio mitius principle, was not prepared to question
the EC action in the absence of at least a presumption that what the
EC did was not enough. This may be correct from a formal point of
view. But the AB here escaped the need to address the causality issue
more fully by hiding behind a rather small tree.
7 The handling of documents in AD proceedings
The Panel faced two claims by Brazil concerning the handling of docu-
ments: first, that a certain document (called ‘‘EC-12’’) was not properly
before the EC investigating authority, and second, that the EC was
under the obligation to disclose it anyway. Document EC-12 was
an internal note for file and included evidence that the EC had properly
examined the injury factors enshrined in Art. 3.4 AD.
7.1 The Panel’s findings
The Panel rejected both claims by Brazil (xx 7.4546 of the Panel
report, op. cit.). The Panel found that the document was properly
before the investigating authority and that the EC was under no
obligation to disclose it. The Panel reached its first conclusion
following a series of questions that it addressed to the EC on the
matter. The Panel reached the second conclusion by finding that, since
the EC had made available to interested parties the raw data used to
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prepare EC-12, the EC’s position that disclosure of EC-12 would be
unwarranted in the absence of additional information was legitimate.
Brazil appealed both Panel findings.
7.2 The AB’s findings
The AB faced two complaints by Brazil:
First, Brazil appealed the Panel’s finding that EC-12 was properly
before the investigating authority, claiming that this finding constituted
an erroneous interpretation of Arts. 17.6, 3.1 and 3.4 AD.
Second, Brazil appealed the Panel’s finding that the EC was under
no obligation to disclose EC-12, claiming that this finding constituted
an erroneous interpretation of the EC’s obligations under Arts. 6.2
and 6.4 AD.
We address each claim in turn.
7.3 Discussion
7.3.1 When is a document properly before
an investigating authority?
Brazil made three claims in this respect: the first was that the Panel’s
finding constituted an erroneous interpretation of Art. 17.6. The second
and the third claims concerned violations of Arts. 3.1 AD and 3.4 AD,
respectively. But these were in effect one and the same claim (since Art. 3.4
is a specification of the generic obligation embedded in Art. 3.1 AD).
Following the AB’s approach, we will examine them jointly.
We start with Brazil’s claim under Art. 17.6 AD, which reads in
relevant part:
In examining the matter referred to in paragraph 5:
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine
whether the authorities’ establishment of the facts was proper and
whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective.
If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was
unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached
a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned . . .
The issue before the AB was whether the Panel’s assessment of the
facts was proper, under Article. 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement, when it
found that Exhibit EC-12 formed part of the record of the underlying
antidumping investigation.
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The AB first noted that the standard of review it applied to such
claims was quite deferential towards the Panel’s and, as its prior case
law made clear, the AB would not interfere lightly with the Panel’s
discretion to act as the assessor of facts. This standard of review entailed,
ipso facto, a high burden of proof for the complainant to meet in alleging
that the Panel did not lawfully exercise its discretion when it found that
the establishment of facts by the EC was proper (by including EC-12
in the record before the investigating authority).
The AB then described in detail Brazil’s claim in this respect. In the
AB’s view, Brazil found fault with the Panel’s position because the
Panel relied solely on the EC assertion that EC-12 was properly before
it (x 126). Hence, in essence, Brazil reproached the Panel for laxity
when dealing with this issue.
The AB rejected the Brazilian claim. In its view, ample record evidence
demonstrated that the Panel did not rely solely on the EC assertion;
it asked the EC a series of questions, and the EC offered evidence
demonstrating that, throughout the investigation, it had relied on EC-12
(xx 1267). In the absence of any contrary evidence supplied by Brazil,
which, as stated above, bore the burden of proof in this respect,
the AB felt that it should not disturb the Panel’s findings (x 128).
Turning to Brazil’s claims under Arts. 3.4 and 3.1 AD, Brazil argued
that the information included in EC-12 was not contemporaneous
with the investigation. In the AB’s words:
[Brazil] asserts that the issue here is that there was no verifiable evidence
of the contemporaneous character of Exhibit EC-12 and, therefore, the
European Communities was not entitled to rely on that document to
evidence its compliance with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
(x 129, italics in the original)
In line with its prior findings in its Thailand  H Beams report
(to which we refer infra), the AB dismissed Brazil’s argument.14 In the
AB’s view, Art. 3.4 AD did not at all prejudge the manner in which the
information (i.e. the injury factors laid down one by one in the body
of this provision) was to be reviewed: investigating authorities were
14 Appellate Body Report, Thailand  Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R,
adopted 5 April 2001.
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required by virtue of this information to review certain information,
and there was no additional obligation.15
7.3.2 Should EC-12 have been disclosed to interested parties?
The AB upheld Brazil’s claim that the EC-12 document should have
been disclosed to interested parties. To reach this conclusion, the AB
first referred to Art. 6.4 AD, which reads:
The authorities shall whenever practicable provide timely opportunities
for all interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the pre-
sentation of their cases, that is not confidential as defined in paragraph 5,
and that is used by the authorities in an anti-dumping investigation, and to
prepare presentations on the basis of this information.
The AB critically distanced itself from the Panel’s findings in this
respect when it dismissed the rationale offered in support of the final
finding in the Panel report, namely that it was for the investigating
authority to judge whether the information at hand was relevant and,
if so, to disclose it. In the AB’s view, it was for the interested parties
to do this (x 145). Moreover, the AB stated that since the investigating
authority’s evaluation of certain injury factors was set out exclusively in
EC-12, this information was in fact used by the EC in its investigation,
and the EC was thus obligated to disclose it to interested parties (x 147).
Finally, the AB agreed with the argument presented before it that
a violation of Art. 6.4 AD leads ipso facto to a violation of Art. 6.2 AD
(x 149). For these reasons it reversed the Panel’s findings and held that
the EC, by not disclosing EC-12, violated its obligations under Arts. 6.2
and 6.4 AD (x 150).
7.3.3 The AB did not address the core issue
We believe that the AB essentially avoided responding to the core of
the Brazilian claim, by adopting an overly formalistic reading of some
AD provisions, and by failing to offer an overall approach as to what
needs to be done, in light of current legislative constraints, when similar
claims are being formulated. Let us first recount the facts:
1. Art. 3.4 AD lays down all factors demonstrating injury that must
be reviewed by an investigating authority;
15 As we will try to develop in Art. 2.6.4, the AB, through this finding, essentially avoided
responding to the real issue.
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2. EC-12 is the sole evidence that the EC did, in fact, examine the factors
reflected in Art. 3.4 AD;
3. The EC did not disclose EC-12 to the Brazilian exporters under
investigation.
Brazil, for all practical purposes, alleges that EC-12 has been ‘‘cooked.’’
It also complains that the document has not been disclosed to its
exporters. The AB agrees with the second claim because, in its view,
anything that the exporter claims is relevant should be disclosed to the
exporter. The AB avoids responding to the former allegation by assert-
ing that all Art. 3.4 AD requires WTO Members to do is to examine
the list of factors mentioned there, without prejudging the manner of
examination.
But, of course, the real issue is whether the EC actually examined
those factors or whether it simply produced an ex post facto justification
under the name EC-12. The AB did not respond to the allegation that
the EC did the latter.
7.3.4 How could Brazil have known the content of EC-12?
This is not the first time that WTO adjudicating bodies have faced
similar claims. In Thailand  H Beams, Poland complained before the
Panel that it was indiscernible from Thailand’s final determination how
that country had complied with the various requirements of the AD
Agreement. Thailand then produced a document that explained in
excruciating detail what had happened during the investigation that
led Thailand to believe that an imposition of duties was in good order.
The Panel in this dispute dismissed the document’s relevance on the
ground that absence of production equals absence of examination.
Thailand appealed, and the AB (in our view, probably rightly so)
rejected the Panel’s finding. In the AB’s view, the possibility that this
information had indeed been used by the Thai authorities could not,
as a matter of principle, be excluded outright simply because the
document reflecting it had not been produced to the interested parties.
In other words, the AB dissociates the obligation to notify from the
obligation to review, without delving into the question whether, in the
AD’s institutional balance, interested parties should be notified of
the content of a review, or to what extent an investigating authority
can use information, relating to a review of the factors mentioned in
Art. 3.4 AD, that at the same time can legitimately be kept away
from interested parties.
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What is the institutional balance embedded in this interpretation
of the AD Agreement? On the one hand, an investigating authority
must publish a final determination that contains in sufficient detail
all issues of law and fact considered material by the investigating
authority (Art. 12.2 AD). Clearly, the words ‘‘considered material’’ leave
room for discretion, and therefore it cannot be ruled out that some
information used in the proceedings to reach the final determination
may be excluded from the public announcement.16 On the other hand,
Art. 6.4 AD obliges investigating authorities to disclose all information
requested by interested parties.17
Assuming that parties had access to the same information, one could
possibly argue that, to the extent that some information was not
requested under Art. 6.4 AD, it was not judged material by the interested
party at hand, and therefore all such subsequent claims on this score
should fail on this ground. But access to information is in practice
not symmetric, and such symmetry is nowhere reflected in the institu-
tional balance of the AD Agreement. Instead, AD investigations take
place within an adversarial system, where the umpire (the investigat-
ing authority) will be asked to administer conflicting information
in a due-process manner. The AD Agreement nowhere imposes on
the authority the obligation to immediately disclose to the exporter,
for example, information submitted by the domestic industry. One
should thus expect that the parties often have very different access
to information.
Hence, an interested party can protect its rights under Art. 6.4 AD
only in a limited manner: it can request information on issues about
which, in one way or another, it has knowledge. With respect to the
other issues, the only information it will (eventually) get will be
through the public notice. But, as argued, an investigating authority
does not have to disclose all information, by virtue of Art. 12.2 AD.
Hence some relevant information might never be transmitted. Article
6.9 AD is not of much help either: according to this provision, an
16 For the purposes of our argument here, we do not need to deal with the situation
where the excluded information, in the case of a challenge, is subsequently judged
material by a WTO Panel. We will return to this point when discussing our suggested
approach.
17 For the purposes of our argument here, we do not need to deal with disclosure
obligations in regard to submitted confidential information. Indeed, in the case at hand,
there was no such argument advanced by Brazil.
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investigating authority must always, before a decision is made, inform
interested parties of the essential facts on which the decision is based.
Once again the term ‘‘essential facts’’ leaves room for discretion.
So, the AB was effectively beating around the bush when ruling under
Art. 6.4 AD. On the one hand, the AB finding in this respect is one
step toward making the due-process clause more effective. Regrettably,
however, it does not go the full nine yards. To do that, we submit,
the AB would have to address Art. 12.2 AD in a meaningful, contextual
manner.
The Pipe Fittings Panel essentially wholeheartedly adopted the AB’s
Thailand  H Beams determination. The AB upheld the Panel’s finding
and, as mentioned supra, reversed only the Panel’s findings with
respect to the disclosure requirement.
If there were an excuse for the AB determination in the Thailand 
H Beams case (since Poland did not argue that the Thai document was
indeed ‘‘cooked’’), there is no such excuse here: Brazil did, in fact,
argue that EC-12 was not properly before the EC investigating
authority because, in all likelihood, it did not exist at the time of the
investigation. Brazil also argued that this conclusion was warranted by
the fact that the document was not produced to Brazil: the disclosure
obligations are thus, in Brazil’s eyes, the institutional safeguard to
guarantee that documents will not be ‘‘cooked.’’
Viewed against this background, the AB rulings are a half-measure:
on the one hand, the AB emphasized the importance of Art. 6.4 AD,
insisting that it is not up to the investigating authority to decide which
information is relevant. But the AB failed to take the bigger picture into
account: how is Brazil to know exactly what has been used as input in
the investigation, other than through communications/notifications to
its exporters? The AD, as we established above, does not require that all
information be transmitted by the investigating authority. But the AD
approach could have been substantially helped, had the AB re-thought
its findings in Thailand  H Beams and elaborated on its reasoning
there. In short, we believe that through a more appropriate allocation
of the burden of proof, concerns similar to those of Brazil in the present
case can be taken care of.
8 Concluding remarks
To conclude, let us just note that in line with our prior writings
in this context, our main source of discontent with this AB report is
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the often acontextual interpretation of some of the key terms of the
AD Agreement. We believe that, read in their context, several provisions
should have been interpreted differently than what was done by the AB.
Consequently, in our view, the AB, in this case following unpersuasive
reasoning, ended up with the wrong outcome.
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